The Dutch Institute for Vulnerability Disclosure (DIVD), a coordinated vulnerability disclosure organisation, announced an intrusion into its own systems on September 24, 2026. It blocked access to its infrastructure and began an investigation with an external response team. Its DIVD-2026-00014 case remains open.
DIVD dates the first malicious access to September 21 and detection to the following day. It later identified two zero-day flaws in its Zammad support software as the entry point. These dates and conclusions reflect the organisation’s published investigation and may be supplemented by later updates.
Two Zammad flaws combined
DIVD links the intrusion to CVE-2026-102489 and CVE-2026-102490. Its case file says the flaws were combined to hijack a session, execute code remotely and move from a Zammad user account to root privileges within seconds. This is DIVD’s account.
In its October 5 advisory, Zammad provides details that qualify this chain. The vendor says CVE-2026-102489 is not practically exploitable on Zammad 7.0 and later; additional hardening is included in version 7.2.0. For CVE-2026-102490, Zammad describes a local privilege escalation that cannot be exploited remotely on its own and requires prior access to the server. The technical scope and how this second flaw fits into the DIVD incident should therefore be presented as differing assessments, not as an independently established mechanism.
The vulnerabilities also prompted a separate DIVD case, DIVD-2026-00015, to notify potentially exposed organisations. Zammad says CVE-2026-102489 practically affects unsupported versions 6.5 and earlier; version 7.2.0 includes additional hardening. The vendor says CVE-2026-102490 remains under analysis and recommends restricting access to Zammad servers to trusted administrators. Check both DIVD’s and Zammad’s advisories before deciding what to do for your version.
What data left DIVD
On October 1, DIVD confirmed that volunteer data had left its systems, including email addresses and possibly other contact details. It has not yet established exactly whose data or which details were affected. The organisation warns that this information could make it easier to impersonate a volunteer.
On October 9, DIVD updated its investigation table, which tracks what is confirmed, ruled out or still under investigation by data category and system. The case confirms access to its ticketing system and the loss of volunteer email addresses; other contact details and data remain under review. The table is not a final inventory of all data that may have been accessed. Network segmentation and its teams’ response are said to have prevented deeper movement through the network.
What DIVD says about the AI agent
DIVD assesses that the modus operandi indicates an attack carried out with an artificial intelligence agent. It published redacted log screenshots that, in its view, show automated scripts justifying their own actions. This is DIVD’s assessment; it is not independent attribution of the operator or the tool.
The organisation says its forensic investigation is ongoing and it cannot yet fully describe the incident’s scope. The case file therefore does not establish that all accessible data was retrieved or publicly identify the person behind the attack.
Steps for affected teams
Zammad operators should check the vendor advisories, apply official fixes or mitigations, and review authentication logs, privileged accounts and activity launched by the application. If the instance could reach mailboxes, databases or integration tokens, assess those paths and rotate secrets after containment.
DIVD volunteers and people communicating with the organisation should verify unexpected messages through a known address, especially if they request a code, document or urgent action. DIVD has provided an official contact address for checking suspicious messages.
The Soclyde connection
A support instance may hold or reach credentials used by a team. Soclyde does not protect Zammad and cannot remediate this intrusion. Its encrypted local-first vault helps users organise passwords and access details on their devices; application permissions, network segmentation and incident response must be handled in the affected environment.
Takeaway
DIVD links the intrusion to two Zammad flaws and confirms volunteer email addresses left its systems, while the full scope remains under investigation. On October 5, Zammad published a different assessment of the CVEs’ practical exploitability, particularly for 7.x versions and the prior access required for CVE-2026-102490. The AI-agent hypothesis remains DIVD’s assessment, which it says is supported by redacted log material it published.
If you use Zammad, follow the vendor advisory and look for unusual activity. To reduce password sprawl across a team, see our guide to local-first password managers.



